The Bali Conference launched far reaching negotiations with a clear deadline for the conclusion of an agreement post-2012. The Bali meetings were successful in delivering a mandate and building blocks for the post-2012 period – the Bali roadmap.

What was Bali about?

The Bali Conference involved a series of events, including the thirteenth Conference of the Parties (COP13) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the third Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP3). These events drew over 10,800 participants, including more than 3,500 government officials, 5,800 representatives of UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations, and nearly 1,500 accredited members of the media.

The Bali Conference decisions have established a process and set out guidance and direction for a series of meetings over the next two years – under both the Convention and Protocol – with the aim of producing a comprehensive outcome on post-2012 issues at COP 15 and COP/MOP 5 in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009.

The challenge of defining precisely what elements of the Bali decisions and outcomes constitute the ‘Bali roadmap’ is its own complex work in progress. Moreover, the exact nature of the agreement that must result from the Bali roadmap is still a matter of debate. There are divergent views on the legal form or architecture that will accommodate and, perhaps elaborate, existing commitments under the Convention and the Protocol in the near term and after 2012.

Bali’s two tracks

The Bali negotiations comprised of two tracks. The Convention Track looked at an alternative, but parallel, process to the Kyoto Protocol – which could include the United States – and will require developing countries to have binding emissions targets. This track built on the Dialogue on Long Term Cooperation and was chaired by Howard Bamsey of Australia. Mr Bamsey was given the mandate by the President of the meetings to develop a Bali roadmap, which would incorporate all elements of the Kyoto track.

The Kyoto Track is driven by Article 9, the review of the Kyoto Protocol and the Ad Hoc Working Group (AWG) on further commitments for Annex 1 parties. This track is looking at how to take the existing Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012, i.e. the shape of the second commitment period. Many developing countries preferred this track.

The work of each track will be important, but – in all probability – it is the convergence of views that will inform deliberations on the ambition and the means for all to contribute to a future agreement or agreements.

The outcome of this will be an effective political response that matches both the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) science and the ultimate objective of the Convention – it was never intended that the Bali Conference would focus on precise targets. Instead, the divergent parties and groups who drive the climate regime process launched a negotiating framework with “building blocks” that may help to square a number of circles – notably, the need to reconcile local and immediate self-interest with the need to pursue action collectively in the common and long-term interests of people and planet.

The institutionalisation of tensions between developed and developing country parties, the crisis of confidence surrounding the implementation of existing commitments, and a growing need for the distribution of responsibilities to reflect the economic power and responsibilities of major emerging economies, have also haunted the process.

While a two-track approach will continue to maintain a degree of separation between discussions under the Convention and the Protocol, the decision by the AWG on Long-Term Cooperative Action uses, for the first time, language on ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, rather than ‘Annex I’ and ‘non-Annex I’ countries. This is widely regarded as a breakthrough. It offers the prospect of moving beyond the constraints of working within only Annex I and non-Annex I countries when defining contributions to a future agreement. It is anticipated that new approaches to differentiating contributions – tied to countries’ economic capacity – will form part of the future architecture. Moreover, the new AWG will also fully engage and address the future role of the United States, which has not ratified the Protocol.

The risk involved, is that certain Annex I parties may seize on this development to jump ship and attempt to adopt more relaxed commitments than those under the Kyoto Protocol. Proposals were therefore placed for the introduction of a firewall that would lock existing Annex I parties into the most ambitious end of the commitment spectrum.

The Bali Conference demonstrated that at certain moments in climate talks, notably when negotiations take place in the full gaze of a public and media, parties come under extreme pressure to face up to the science. The high-level political attention given to climate change has introduced an unprecedented level of interest and investment of expertise by organisations, not only by research and advocacy organisations, but also by the media – who are better informed than at any time since the emergence of the climate change agenda.

The ICSE and Business Scorecard

The International Council for Sustainable Energy (ICSE) is an alliance of the Australian Clean Energy Council and the European, United Kingdom and United States Business Councils for Sustainable Energy. The ICSE is accredited with the UNFCCC and includes business groups representing a broad constituency from different sectors and countries.

On the first day of the negotiations, the ICSE, together with other business groups, agreed on criteria by which to evaluate the outcome of the talks in Bali. Companies are increasingly concerned about a lack of long-term regulatory clarity as they invest in and deploy clean energy technologies. The business groups developed the ‘Progress in Bali Business Scorecard’ – an eight point checklist for negotiators.

Local politics on the international stage – Australia and the US

At COP/MOP 3, the interplay between international climate politics and domestic politics was illustrated by the attention on Australia’s election outcome. The new Australian Government was warmly welcomed in Bali and Australia’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was repeatedly acknowledged in the plenary sessions.

The Prime Minister’s opening speech to the plenary was important on many levels. Of particular relevance was his affirmation of the domestic policy initiatives such as 20 per cent renewable energy by 2020. This was followed by his comment that “we won’t let you down” at the Australian Government/Industry reception in Bali.

The Garnaut Review is clearly Australia’s policy lynchpin and will be used to justify a whole range of domestic and international policy positions. During Bali, the Government struggled to balance its domestic position of waiting for the results of the Garnaut Review with the international call for a stronger Bali roadmap that includes a target range for reductions of aggregate emission reductions by industrialised countries in the range of 25-40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020. This debate is expected to continue in Poland at COP14/MOP4.

Global dynamics also shifted dramatically at the conference as, without support from Australia, the United States was forced to concede on a number of issues. Whatever the outcome, it is expected that the United States election in November 2008 will have a dramatic impact on the global climate change regime.

The way forward

The clean energy industry now has a crucial role in ensuring the details in the Bali roadmap promote the role of clean energy in reducing global emissions, through a strong and robust legally binding framework.